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Quentin Meillassoux, like his mentor Alain Badiou, is sometimes accused by his 
critics of “fetishizing mathematics.” Without embracing the negative judgment 
implied in such a charge, this essay asks: what might be gained by taking 
seriously the link between fetishism and speculative philosophy? The claim that 
Meillassoux “fetishizes” mathematics potentially reveals something fundamental 
not only about the formalism at the heart of his speculative realism (whose 
“glaciality,” inanimacy, or inhuman character might sustain a certain disavowal, 
namely of “finitude” or castration) but about fetishism itself, whose philosophical 
character is attested not only by its ideality or relation to the absolute, but by its 
concern with thought or construction. The aim of this essay is thus not to dwell at 
length on the work of Meillassoux, but rather to think about the “speculative 
realism” specific to fetishism itself, and its unique contribution to speculative 
philosophy.  
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Is the fetish a thing? And if so, what kind of thing is it? Is it a thing to be thought? 
A thing that thwarts or suspends thought? A thing that thinks? What can it tell us 
about the thought of things?  
I ask these questions today not primarily from the perspective of 
psychoanalytic theory, but at the provocation of the philosophical movement that 
has done so much recently to foreground the problem of the thing, to put things 
before us and above all to insist on the priority of things over the consciousness 
we might have of them: a field of enquiry whose avatars include Object-Oriented 
Ontology, Speculative Realism, and the New Materialism. 
I am thinking in particular of Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of philosophical 
“correlationism,” his name for the assumption that our knowledge of things is 
inherently limited, condemned to “finitude,” as a result of its mediation by 
consciousness—and, ultimately, by the language that structures that 
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consciousness.1 Meillassoux argues that post-Kantian philosophy has long 
considered the existence of things only in the guise of givenness, supposing that 
it is impossible to think the thing-in-itself otherwise than as a thing that exists for 
us. More specifically, his project takes aim at the legacy of the so-called 
“linguistic turn” in modern philosophy, and with it the assumption that language 
alone gives existence to what is, even as this mediation condemns it to loss. He 
enjoins his readers to aspire to “achieve what modern philosophy has been 
telling us for the past two centuries is impossibility itself: to get out of ourselves, 
to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or not” (27, emphases in 
original).  
Meillassoux proposes to move beyond the impasses of correlationism by 
forging a new alliance between philosophy and science, founding his speculative 
project on a recourse to mathematics in the place of language or 
consciousness.2 In the opening pages of After Finitude, he argues for a 
rehabilitation of René Descartes’ discredited distinction between the “primary” 
and “secondary” qualities of objects, or between those qualities that are 
inseparable from the object and qualities that depend on the apprehension of a 
subject. For Descartes, primary qualities “are all of those properties which pertain 
to extension and which are therefore subject to geometrical proof: length, width, 
movement, depth, figure, size” (2). Putting aside extension (which he views as 
inseparable from sensible representation), Meillassoux proposes “to reactivate 
the Cartesian thesis in contemporary terms,” advancing that 
all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in 
mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of 
the object in itself. All those aspects of the object that can give rise 
to a mathematical thought (to a formula or to digitalization) rather 
than to a perception or sensation can be meaningfully turned into 
properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is 
without me. 
 The thesis we are defending is therefore twofold: on the one 
hand, we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a subject’s 
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relation to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the 
mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the 
constraint of such a relation, and that they are effectively in the 
object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I am in relation 
with this object or not (2, emphases in original). 
What Meillassoux proposes to call “absolute knowledge,” therefore—knowledge 
of the “glacial,” “nonhuman,” or “ancestral” world—is mathematical knowledge. 
The “enigma which we must confront,” he writes, is “mathematics’ ability to 
discourse about the great outdoors, to discourse about a past where both 
humanity and life are absent” (26, emphases in original). Mathematics is an 
inhuman or “ancestral” language, a language that does not require humanity to 
exist: and that is therefore not afflicted by lack or finitude. 
Meillassoux’s explicit project is to reunite philosophy and science by 
proposing a new articulation of what, until now, have been the two extremes of 
philosophical method, both increasingly marginalized: realism (or empiricism) 
and idealism (the realm of the absolute). He seeks to understand and to justify 
the work of the empirical sciences (and thus a certain kind of realism), while at 
the same time affirming the speculative project of thinking the “absolute” that has 
traditionally been the purview of philosophical idealism. Mathematics is what 
guarantees their articulation. Yet critics of Meillassoux’s work often charge that 
its speculative attempt to think the “outside,” to get as close as possible to the 
reality of “what is,” either clings to a dogmatic realism (as in the claim that only 
those objects whose properties can be mathematized really exist) or results in 
the most abstract idealism.3  
Some critics, including those who are broadly sympathetic to 
Meillassoux’s project, have expressed reservations about what they find to be its 
“fetishization of mathematics”4 (a charge that is often directed against the work of 
Meillassoux’s teacher and mentor Alain Badiou, as well). In charging that 
Meillassoux “fetishizes” mathematics, they may mean no more in context than 
that he ascribes exceptional powers to math, or puts too much faith in it as a 
speculative method.5 Whatever the intention, however, I believe that this charge 
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rightly identifies his project—and not at all speciously—with another genealogy, 
to which the charge of “fetishizing” mathematics alludes (however 
unintentionally): the genealogy of perverse reflection on the real. 
What would it mean to take seriously the link with fetishism? In my view, 
the charge that Meillassoux “fetishizes mathematics” potentially reveals 
something fundamental not only about the stakes of the formalism at the heart of 
his speculative realism (whose “glaciality,” inanimacy, or inhuman character 
might sustain a certain disavowal, namely of “finitude” or castration) but about 
fetishism itself: whose fundamentally philosophical character is attested not only 
by its ideality or relation to the absolute, but by its concern with thought or 
construction.  
 
I. Which Real? 
The attempt to make the real and the ideal coincide, and therefore to bypass 
correlation (or language and its finitude) altogether, might actually be the very 
definition of the perverse endeavor. The fetish is the object par excellence that 
secures this project, since it is a thing that is at once concrete and real (a shoe, 
braid, undergarment or other object) and purely ideal (the maternal phallus). It 
attempts to suture the psychical and the physical by lodging in the order of 
empirical reality an object that only “exists” in the mind, such that the psychical 
meaning of the object—the endeavor to prove that the maternal phallus really 
exists—converges with and is sustained by the “realness” of the thing. It joins the 
real and the ideal as few things do.  
The fetish is therefore a thing that has the potential to elucidate better than 
any other both the potential pitfalls of a speculative realism and its genuine 
promise. Like mathematics, the fetish gives access to the “thing-in-itself” (in this 
case the maternal phallus) in a way that is impossible for language, 
consciousness, and sense perception. In the case of the fetish, of course, this 
“thing” is also wholly mental. But isn’t mathematics also concerned with a purely 
mental object—not only for Greek ontology, but in its most contemporary 
iterations? At a minimum, the problem of the mental object engages two different 
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ways of thinking about mathematics, one essentially Cartesian (which 
understands mathematics as the foundation of the scientific method, and thus of 
empiricism), and the other Platonic (where mathematics is the language of 
reason, and thus the construction of a supersensible truth). 
Some would argue that a fetish is not a thing at all (or at least not a thing-
in-itself) and therefore not relevant to the project of a speculative realism. But if 
we exclude the fetish from the order of things, haven’t we also given up on an 
important avatar of thinghood, and with it a crucial dimension of the real? This 
question goes to the heart of one of the major debates within the object-oriented 
or speculative realist enterprise, namely the question of which objects or things 
count as real or can be considered to exist. Tristan Garcia, for example, argues 
that an object-oriented ontology must consider existence to be an attribute of all 
things, without exclusion. In his “weak ontology,” a fantasy is as much a thing as 
a rock or a chair, since all objects are equally real—including objects of 
imagination or delusion.6 All things exist, and existence is not merely to be 
ascribed to those things whose existence can be verified empirically. 
Meillassoux, on the other hand, excludes objects that exist only for humans from 
what exists “in itself,” whose privileged exemplars are invariably inanimate or 
“ancestral”7 realities (for example, the date of the earth’s accretion8), or the so-
called “arche-fossils”9 that indicate their existence. 
My aim here is not to dwell at length on the work of Meillassoux (or for that 
matter of his fellow travelers), but rather to think about the “speculative realism” 
specific to fetishism itself, and its unique contribution to speculative philosophy.  
 
II. Perversions of the Linguistic Turn 
This essay is related to a work in progress, provisionally entitled Libertine 
Mathematics: Perversions of the Linguistic Turn. It seeks to put masterpieces of 
the libertine tradition by the Marquis de Sade, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, and 
the Comte de Lautréamont in dialogue with recent philosophical works that have 
embraced the language of mathematical formalization—or of other non-signifying 
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languages—as a means of contesting the so-called “linguistic turn” in twentieth 
century thought.  
These two series of works are more closely related than they might at first 
appear, since the devotion to mathematics is a major preoccupation both of 
libertine literature and of some of its most important authors. Sade and Casanova 
both authored mathematical treatises of some significance, and Casanova even 
earned a living as a professor of mathematics when he was not traveling the 
world seducing the hundreds of virgins he claimed to have deflowered. Richard 
von Krafft-Ebing, whose Psychopathia Sexualis was the first major work to 
attempt a taxonomy of the perversions, even identified the predilection for 
“mathematical patterns” as an essential trait of sadism.10 (Gilles Deleuze 
observes that Sade in particular has a surprising affinity with Spinoza, who 
arguably belongs to the same genealogy: both rely upon “a naturalistic and 
mechanistic approach imbued with the mathematical spirit.”11) But what links 
these libertine and philosophical works, beyond their shared investment in 
mathematics, is their shared dream of an unmediated confrontation with the real. 
In the logic of perversion, the real is always first and foremost the real of 
the drive. Like the real at stake in mathematics, Deleuze observes that “the death 
drive cannot be ‘given’ in psychic life, even in the unconscious, but is essentially 
silent—which is why we can speak of it only in speculative or mythical terms.”12 
This is why he understands Freud’s theory of the death drive not merely as a 
description of what he observes in the clinic, but as a foray into “speculative 
philosophy”: an attempt to locate a “real” that is not given empirically, and that 
therefore demands to be constructed. 
The ungivenness of the death drive, and the corresponding need to 
substantiate or construct it, is arguably the central preoccupation of perversion 
and its most important contribution to the field of psychoanalysis. In seeking to 
render visible or give voice to the drive, perverse practices can thus be 
understood as staging a demonstration of what cannot be represented. In so 
doing, they might also be understood as advancing another understanding of 
language, which is not opposed to the drive or founded upon the negation of the 
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real (Hegel’s “the word is the death of the thing”), but a language of the drive: a 
“language of the real” that is not conditioned by lack or finitude. In Sade’s work, 
the libertine who declares his freedom from the laws that seek to limit the drive 
also appeals to a new ground of authority in the real, frequently figured as a 
“voice of nature” that “commands” the libertine to execute its will: an unspoken 
voice whose authority is not limited by speech, but expressed in the drives and 
impulses that take hold of the libertine and compel him to act. This “voice” not 
only speaks in and through the subject whose actions it dictates, but provokes 
the manifestation of a language that has nothing to do with the finitude and 
decompletion of human speech. In practices of torture—as in the violent marking 
or testing of the body in masochistic ritual punishment—the body itself is made to 
“speak,” to give expression to a real that cannot pass through language. 
While the libertine’s pursuit of an intense and often violent confrontation 
with the real often entails a great deal of risk, it could also be understood 
precisely as an attempt to eliminate risk: not only the threat of castration (whose 
“disavowal” defines perversion, in Freud’s lexicon), but more fundamentally the 
risk that presides over every instance of speech, inasmuch as it involves a 
mediation (of experience, of the “energy” of the drives, of truth…) by a language 
that prevents the real from being transmitted in its integrity. Unlike the logics of 
communication that define instinctual animal languages, and that involve the 
integral transmission of information from an emitter to a receiver, human speech 
is always marked by the failure of communication or transmission; it is this risk of 
failure that the perverse hero of libertine literature seeks to control or even 
eradicate. 
This is where mathematics often comes in, as a language that appears to 
defy the failure or uncertainty that defines every attempt to represent the real in 
speech. Sade’s libertine philosopher, when he does not explicitly identify himself 
as an amateur logician or mathematician, at the very least appeals to 
mathematical reasoning in his diatribes against the “divine chimera,” the illusory 
God of Judeo-Christian theology and his unfounded law. Serge André notes that 
the libertine’s quest for a totalizing language also finds expression in the two 
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great passions of Sade the man: for geography—“the system that names and 
inventories every point on the Earth’s great body,” in his words—and for 
mathematics.13 In this reading, Sade would appeal to mathematics in an attempt 
to make visible the Mother’s body, to constitute it as a whole. Despite their 
obvious differences, therefore, mathematics could be said to share with the 
bodily inscription of the drive in acts of violence or torture the promise of allowing 
for an integral transmission, the possibility of “speaking all of the real,” acceding 
to the thing-in-itself. 
These examples show how mathematics might be understood as having a 
“fetish” function, that of plugging up a lack on the part of the real. The claim that 
there is a specifically fetishistic attitude toward language is not in and of itself 
particularly novel, of course. Jacques Derrida, in his influential elaboration of the 
logic of the “supplement,” even implies that such an attitude is what defines the 
use of language as such. He deconstructs the classical devaluation of writing 
(and of linguistic representation more broadly) as a distorting or merely 
“secondary” representation of the signified—and thus the absenting or negation 
of an originary presence—by showing how the signifier as “supplement” 
invariably substitutes or compensates for a lack on the part of the real. What 
appears as a supernumerary “addition” is thus logically inseparable from the lack 
that is its condition of possibility.  
Jacques-Alain Miller, in his contemporaneous essay “Suture,” makes an 
important contribution to this argument in attempting to prove that the field of 
mathematical logic is marked by the same equivocal relation to lack that defines 
every discourse where a subject is at stake. His argument proceeds through a 
demonstration borrowed from Frege, in which the position of a zero defined as 
lacking its own identity is shown to condition the serial constitution of numbers. 
The position of this zero-as-lack is “sutured” by the zero number, which stands in 
for its absence in the series of numbers. The zero number can therefore be 
understood as having a “fetishistic” function, inasmuch as it fills in for an absence 
and so allows the serial constitution of numbers to hold together as a field.14  
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Derrida and Miller both understand “fetish” in the sense of “supplement,” 
where the addition of the signifier is called upon to compensate or fill in for an 
originary lack (recalling Freud’s famous dictum concerning the fetish, that a 
“multiplication of penis symbols always signifies castration”15). This lack is itself a 
consequence of language, inasmuch as we only access the real—nature or 
being—by means of the signifier, and so inevitably lose it as a “thing.” If it is 
possible to construct a mental image of a maternal phallus, therefore—an object 
that does not exist in the world—it is because language, the phallic signifier, 
causes the female body to be viewed as “lacking,” and therefore as needing to 
be supplemented. 
The theory of castration, especially as elaborated in Lacan’s reading of 
Freud, suggests that the real is “not all there,” that it is lacking as a result of 
language.16 Castration would thus be the lens through which we perceive the 
world, as Lacan’s formula of the fantasy suggests. This in turn suggests that the 
theory of castration is a crucial avatar of correlationism. Indeed, “castration” is 
really a synonym for what Meillassoux calls “correlation,” especially in its “strong” 
version. This is because castration really boils down to mediation, or the loss of 
the “outdoors” that is the consequence of man’s subjection to the signifier.  
In disavowing castration, therefore, the fetishist would be disavowing not 
merely the traumatic discovery of lack in the mother’s body, but the structural 
castration or lack that is the consequence of the human being’s entry into the 
order of the signifier and the finitude it implies. The fetishist, like all perverts, 
wants to demonstrate that we aren’t really afflicted by lack or castration. To the 
finitude in which the mediation of language entraps us, perversion opposes the 
logic of the drive: a real in excess of language, which the signifier is unable to 
name or to limit, that is without beginning and without end, that has no aim and 
therefore cannot be exhausted. The real it upholds is not the real of the empirical 
sciences, therefore, but a real that is legible only in relation to the phallic mother 
of perverse fantasy.  
As a theory of finitude, the problematic of castration (and its refusal) 
arguably must be grappled with in any attempt to refute or bypass finitude. If we 
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accept this premise, it suggests an easy response to Meillassoux et al, one that 
numerous critics have made more or less explicitly: the critic of correlationism is 
merely disavowing castration, railing against a structural impossibility that can be 
surmounted only in fantasy.17 The analogy with fetishism would thus suggest one 
way of thinking about the “great outdoors” that is the object of Meillassoux’s 
speculative quest: this “outside” would be a fantasmatic outside, the projection of 
fantasy into the world, and not merely a concrete or preexisting place or thing 
that we would perceive imperfectly or in a subjective matter. 
 
III. The “Thought from Outside”  
On one level, the charge that Meillassoux “fetishizes” mathematics simply 
underscores the psychical dimension of any attempt to access the real, to think it 
in its integrity in a way not limited by the “finitude” or lack imposed by language. It 
reintroduces as essential or unavoidable the dimension of mediation or 
“correlation.”  
My point here, however, is not simply to criticize Meillassoux’s account of 
correlationism (and thereby reinscribe it within the “linguistic turn” by showing it to 
be afflicted by the very finitude it attempts to escape), but rather to suggest that it 
can fruitfully be inserted within another genealogy, also associated with 
perversion, that deserves to be taken seriously as more than just a symptom or a 
pathology. Michel Foucault memorably calls it “the thought from outside.”18 It is, 
he writes, 
a thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as 
though from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine 
forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that, at the same 
time, stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its 
foundation or justification but in order to retain the space of its 
unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is 
constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment 
they are glimpsed—a thought that, in relation to our knowledge, 
Konturen VIII (2015) 109 
constitutes what in a phrase we might call “the thought of the 
outside.”19  
A “breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded,” the “thought 
of the outside” is an experience that Foucault suggests is “now being heralded at 
diverse points in culture: in the simple gesture of writing as in attempts to 
formalize language; in the study of myths as in psychoanalysis; in the search for 
a Logos that would be like the birthplace of all of Western reason” (149). 
But Foucault famously anchors this genealogy in the writings of Sade, 
describing him as the first writer to lay bare the “thought from outside” by tearing 
open the bubble in which Western consciousness had progressively interiorized 
the world: 
[T]he first rending to expose the thought of the outside was, 
paradoxically, the recursive monologue of the Marquis de Sade. In 
the age of Kant and Hegel, at a time when the interiorization of the 
law of history and the world was being imperiously demanded by 
Western consciousness as never before, Sade never ceases 
speaking of the nakedness of desire as the lawless law of the 
world. (150) 
It is therefore no exaggeration, he argues, to claim that Sade “introduced” 
the experience of the outside into our thinking: an experience that “was 
afterward to remain not exactly hidden, because it had not penetrated the 
thickness of our culture, but afloat, foreign, exterior to our interiority, for 
the entire time the demand was being formulated, most imperiously, to 
interiorize the world” (150-151). 
Here, as elsewhere, Foucault suggests that the “outside,” the desire “to 
get out of ourselves, to grasp the in-itself,” is a preoccupation to which perverse 
thought has a privileged, if not exclusive, relationship. In addition to Sade, the 
essay is concerned with the writing of several of Foucault’s contemporaries, 
including Georges Bataille (the visionary of “transgression,” 154), Pierre 
Klossowski (who celebrates “the exteriority of simulacra,” 153) and Maurice 
Blanchot (whose language is effaced “in a silence that is not the intimacy of a 
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secret but a pure outside where words endlessly unravel,” 152).20 They are 
Sade’s heirs not only in wielding “a language from which the subject is excluded” 
(149), but in their predilection for a certain formalism. Where Sade excels at 
“deploying structure in its most arithmetical positivity,”21 their prose is “precise,” 
“rigorous,” even (in the case of Blanchot) “geometric” (153). 
If “desire”—or what Sade himself calls jouissance—is revealed in his work 
to be the “lawless law of the world,” then it should also be understood as 
stepping into the place that has long been that of mathematics, for philosophy 
and for the empirical sciences alike. On the one hand, this might suggest that the 
drive or jouissance takes the place of mathematics, supplanting or displacing it. 
On the other, it suggests that the fidelity to the drive manifests itself as a kind of 
formalism, as a predilection for a language that is “arithmetic” or “geometric,” and 
from which the subject seems to have been excluded.  
In heralding this “libertine mathematics,” one aim of my own project is to 
argue for the immense but rarely interrogated importance of libertine or perverse 
thought for contemporary philosophy, and French philosophy in particular. This is 
something crucial one has to understand about French thought to realize that its 
association with perversion is not at all pejorative. In some ways Foucault is the 
key figure in this intellectual history, the author who really claims perverse 
thought for philosophy, history and psychoanalysis in myriad works written over a 
period of thirty years, from The Order of Things to The History of Sexuality to 
Discipline and Punish. But he is certainly not alone. Some of the most important 
philosophers of structuralism and post-structuralism in particular draw on this 
corpus, and not merely in their treatments of sexuality and norms. The problem 
of “excess” is frequently the frame for this interest in the first half of the twentieth 
century (notably in the work of Bataille), while the “real” is more often the focus of 
works produced after the war (especially in the wake of Jacques Lacan).  
To mention only a few of the greatest hits, the post-war years witnessed 
the publication in France of Pierre Klossowski’s Sade My Neighbor and The 
Philosopher Villain (1947), Maurice Blanchot’s Lautréamont and Sade (1949), 
Bataille’s The Accursed Share [La Part maudite] (1949) and Literature and Evil 
Konturen VIII (2015) 111 
(1957), Lacan’s “Kant avec Sade” (1963), Deleuze’s Présentation de Sacher-
Masoch [Coldness and Cruelty] (1967), Derrida’s reading of Bataille in Writing 
and Difference (“From a Restricted to a General Economy: A Hegelianism 
without Reserve,” 1967), Roland Barthes’ Sade, Fourier, Loyola (1971), Jean-
François Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (1974), and Deleuze’s two major 
collaborations with Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus (1972 
and 1980). With few exceptions, these authors are not merely writing about 
perversion, but writing from the vantage of perverse experience in a way that 
foregrounds its singular contribution to thought. Today the list only continues to 
grow, notably with the works of the self-declared pervert-philosophers Slavoj 
Žižek and Mario Perniola.22 
These are not only studies of (or by) perverse authors, however, but 
interventions into fundamental problems of philosophy for which the 
masterpieces of perverse literature serve as exemplary models and guides. Alain 
Badiou has argued that the twentieth century was animated by a “passion for the 
real,”23 attested by a range of different phenomena: the frequency of wars and 
revolutionary upheavals, the development of nuclear fission, and even the 
embrace of “purifying” violence in practices of genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
The “passion for the real” is defined not merely by the celebration of violence, 
however, but by a contestation of the order of the signifier and of the 
representations and grand narratives it supported. One of its most important 
expressions, he argues, is the confrontation with the real in modern mathematics, 
which entails the risk of foregoing language and linguistic representation in favor 
of a formal “construction” of the real that has no imaginary or representational 
dimension. But it also appears in the premium psychoanalysis places on the 
confrontation with the death drive as the formative event in the subject’s life—a 
theory for which perverse practices serve as an indispensable precursor and 
guide by exposing the signifier’s inability to limit the real of the drive. In a roughly 
contemporaneous essay on mathematics and philosophy, Badiou underscores 
their implicit connection when he declares himself the “one and only genuine 
disciple” of the Comte de Lautréamont,24 the great libertine poet whose passion 
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for the real expresses itself both as a fidelity to mathematics and as a 
masochistic allegiance to the drive in its violent purity.25 
In one of the most recent contributions to this rich vein of thought, Mario 
Perniola has even claimed that philosophy should be understood not merely as 
attuned to perverse thought, but as the ultimate realization of the pervert’s quest. 
Writing of Pasolini’s film Salò (an adaptation of Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom set in 
the waning days of Mussolini’s fascist regime), he advances that 
philosophy alone has the capacity of reaching that extreme excess 
that Pasolini pursues with obstinacy in his film. The sadistic search 
occurs under the sign of frustration and defeat. One can burn 
breasts and testicles, pull teeth and eyes, impale, skin and flay to 
infinity without succeeding in reaching that excess that philosophy 
achieves with chastity.26 
Philosophy is the formalization of sadism, a sadism purified of its sensuality (a 
point Deleuze also makes, in striking similar terms, in Coldness and Cruelty: a 
book whose argument I will return to momentarily). 
As these examples ought to make clear, my characterization of the 
recourse to mathematics and formalization as “perverse” should not be 
understood as a dismissive criticism, or especially as implying that such a project 
is ill-founded, misguided or illusory. To the contrary, the juxtaposition of 
philosophy and perverse thought is intended not to pathologize philosophy so 
much as to elevate perversion—and to isolate its real contribution to philosophy. 
Put another way, I see no reason not to take Sade at his word when he claims (in 
the title of his most influential work) to be doing philosophy in the bedroom, and 
not just telling stories or generating pornography.  
In reading the works I have just mentioned, it is striking how often the 
“new” comes up in discussions of perversion. The perversions are arguably the 
source of all novelty, as the example of the fetish—a radically new object, without 
precedent in the world—suggests. This way of thinking about the perversions—
not as a “regression” or reversion to an earlier stage in human development, but 
as the anticipation, inauguration or introduction of the unprecedented or unheard-
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of—is perhaps developed most fully in the work of Lacan, especially in his 
emphasis on the close relationship between perversion and art. But Freud 
already anticipated this line of thought when he argued that the boy’s curiosity 
about sex—and more specifically, his urgent desire to know whether the mother 
is possessed of a penis—might be the origin of his epistemic drive:27 and 
therefore, we might infer, of the “love of knowledge” that philosophy enshrines as 
its singular project.28 I understand this comment not as a denigration or 
pathologizing of the philosophical quest for knowledge, but rather an insight into 
the truly philosophical stakes of sexual curiosity—especially in its perverse 
manifestations. 
In the space that remains, therefore, I would like to think about the 
productive implications—and not merely the potential pitfalls—of philosophy’s 
perverse turn.  
 
IV. Beyond Disavowal: the Fetish as a Construction of the Real 
The standard way of understanding the fetish, as we have seen, is as a 
disavowal of mediation or “castration.” By reinserting this mediation, showing 
how it is operating there “all the same,” we reinscribe the fetish in the logic of the 
signifier, of castration (psychoanalysis) or of supplementarity (Derrida). Fetishism 
now describes a general pathology, a generic way of refusing what language 
does to our relation to the “outside.” 
Gilles Deleuze offers a completely novel approach to this familiar 
problematic, however, which allows us to grasp the more profound relation of 
fetishism to philosophy. It concerns the problem of construction, or the nature of 
the real or truth that is opposed to a deficient reality; it therefore considers what 
the logic of perversion seeks to illuminate or make visible, above and beyond 
what it refuses or strives to disavow. Key to this reading is Deleuze’s insight that 
the fetish actually belongs to the complex of masochism, and to the death drive 
that masochistic ritual practice seeks to stage and uphold. It shows the fetish to 
have another function, which is not so easily reduced to the disavowal of 
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mediation and that cannot be wholly inscribed within the order of the signifier or 
language. 
In Coldness and Cruelty (1967), his remarkable reading of Sacher-
Masoch’s Venus in Furs, Deleuze even argues that masochism is defined by the 
pursuit of “supersensualism,” and not—as one might suppose—of a quest for 
unbounded sensuality, or the eroticization of pain or suffering. On the face of it, 
this claim is counter-intuitive. The perverse demonstration seems to aim at an 
intensification of sensuality, notably through the sensations of pleasure and pain. 
Even in Sacher-Masoch’s novel, Severin appears to swing from masochism to 
sadism, or between the pleasure taken in receiving pain to the pleasure taken in 
delivering it.  
But while Deleuze admits that the masochistic adventure of Venus is 
structured by a series of dialectical reversals, he contends that it is not the 
Hegelian dialectic that holds sway here, but a Platonic “dialectic of the 
imagination” (22) that aims at the “supersensualism” of the Ideal. He suggests 
that masochism aims at a specific “freezing” or suspension of the “pendulum 
swing” between two poles, which are represented in the novel by two different 
modes of sensuality: the hedonistic ideal of the Greek woman or Aphrodite who 
dedicates herself solely to the pursuit of pleasure, and the tortures of the sadist. 
The masochist seeks to identify a specific supersensualism that is pursued in—
and also beyond—sensual experience. Thematically it is expressed by the ideal 
of “coldness,” which in freezing the warmth of sensuality allows a specific 
severity to emerge.29 The Greek ideal is transformed into the masochistic ideal 
through “the catastrophe of the glacial epoch, which accounts for both the 
repression of sensuality and the triumphant rise of severity” (52-3). The Ideal is 
thus “the specific freezing point, the point at which idealism is realized” (55). Only 
at this “freezing point” can the masochistic ideal of the “cold mother” exist; only 
here does the maternal phallus, which has no sensual existence, reveal itself in 
its timeless eternity, in the form of frozen images, impersonal traits, and 
inanimate objects.30  
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It is here that Deleuze introduces the fetish: not as a compensation for 
what is missing, but as a support for this supersensual ideal. Deleuze follows 
Freud in affirming that the fetish is the “image or substitute of the female phallus,” 
and thus “the means by which we deny that a woman lacks a penis.”31 More 
importantly, however, it functions as what he calls a “protective and idealizing 
neutralization.” That is, “the belief in a female phallus is itself experienced as a 
protest of the ideal against the real; it remains suspended or neutralized in the 
ideal, the better to shield itself against the painful awareness of reality.” It follows, 
Deleuze writes, that “disavowal should perhaps be understood as the point of 
departure of an operation that consists…in radically contesting the validity of that 
which is: it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new 
horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it” (31). 
(In other words, the fetish substitutes not for a “real” penis, but for the 
maternal phallus that does not exist in reality: and that for that very reason lays 
claim to being the ideal or “true” phallus: the one that never fails, that is not 
subject to castration. As Serge André’s perverse patient Violette puts it, a woman 
is superior to a man because she never loses her erection; only a woman who 
does not actually “have” a penis can never lose it.32 In Platonic terms, we might 
say that the maternal phallus is the “ideal form,” the male penis its “copy.” The 
fetish therefore opposes the Ideal—the maternal phallus that does not “exist”—to 
the real: the male penis that, by virtue of “existing,” is necessarily secondary with 
respect to the ideal.) 
The attainment of this “specific freezing point” thus serves two aims. The 
first is defensive, where the suspension of movement has the effect of making 
time stand still—and so freezing the threat of castration in its tracks (31). But the 
second and more important function of this frozen arrest is to elucidate another 
reality: that of the maternal phallus, certainly, but in and beyond it the reality of 
the death drive itself. Here it is important to recall that for Freud, inanimacy is the 
form in which the death drive is most often expressed in its ungivenness. The 
formalism of the masochist’s surrender to the mother’s icy discipline sustains not 
only a certain maternal ideal, therefore, but the suspension, timelessness and 
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inanimacy of the death drive itself. (In Sacher-Masoch’s work their interrelation is 
figured by the “cold steppe” of Mother Russia, a perpetually frozen tundra 
virtually devoid of life that is nonetheless animated in his writing by the vital 
energy of the drive.) The relationship between the “cold mother” and the death 
drive is already implied in Sacher-Masoch’s three feminine types, in which 
Deleuze sees three fundamental mother images: the primitive, uterine mother; 
the Oedipal mother, figure of the beloved, who becomes linked with the sadistic 
father as victim or as accomplice; and the oral mother, the mother of the steppe, 
who nurtures and brings death (55). (Freud, he reminds us, found the same 
trinity in the Three Fates: “The mother herself, the beloved who is chosen after 
her pattern, and finally the Mother Earth who receives him again… the third of 
the Fates alone, the silent goddess of Death, will take him into her arms.”33) 
This is why fetishism belongs to masochism, and thus to a speculative 
enterprise. With this argument, Deleuze underscores the profound connection 
between fetishism and the death drive that is too often ignored by the theoretical 
literature on the perversions. Indeed, the “supersensualism in and beyond 
sensual experience” that Deleuze reads as the object of Severin’s quest might 
even be a definition of the death drive, as Deleuze reads it. As a drive to the 
inorganic, the death drive is fundamentally opposed to sensuality, and 
specifically to pleasure and pain. This is why Deleuze understands Freud’s 
account of the death drive as the “beyond of the pleasure principle” not in terms 
of the transgression of a boundary or limit (going “beyond pleasure” into 
something painful or traumatic, for example), but rather as a foray into 
speculative philosophy, an attempt to identify the transcendent principle or 
“higher law” of the pleasure principle, the supersensual law of its sensual 
manifestations. 
The “glacial anti-humanism” that Badiou ascribes to Lautréamont’s 
evocation of math resonates powerfully with this frozen ideal: as if Lautréamont 
had found in mathematics the “cold mother” who proves so elusive to the 
masochist in reality. At the same time, the link between fetishism and 
mathematics suggests not only that mathematics is capable of functioning 
Konturen VIII (2015) 117 
fetishistically or sustaining a disavowal, but that the fetish is a method, a form of 
speculative thought. Put another way, it implies the fetish is not only a thing to be 
thought, but a thing that thinks.34  
 
V. Fetishism’s Speculative Enterprise: From Maternal Phallus to Death 
Drive 
Deleuze shows that what Freud calls “perversion,” and which has for him a 
specific fantasy profile, may well be what in another idiom is called “speculative 
philosophy.” In the same spirit, I want to claim not merely that speculative realism 
is sometimes fetishistic, but more broadly that fetishism is a speculative realism 
(and deserves to be taken seriously as such). This is not to say that fetishism 
does not have a disavowing function, but simply to add (with Deleuze) that 
disavowal does not merely refuse the reality of castration, but also opens up a 
“new horizon…beyond the given and in place of it.” The “glacial epoch” or 
“specific freezing point” that masochistic suspension seeks to isolate appears as 
a depiction or construction of the phallic mother, its “making visible,” and not just 
a refusal of lack (what would be “missing” or “absent”). This function of “giving 
visibility to what cannot be seen” might even be the central contribution of the 
perversions to human subjectivity, and the dimension of perversion that explains 
its foundational status in the theory of psychoanalysis. It really underscores the 
speculative in speculative realism, since it is concerned with an object that 
cannot be verified and that is not presented to consciousness.  
As Deleuze demonstrates so compellingly, this object is the death drive 
itself, and not merely—as I have suggested so far—the maternal phallus. It is the 
ability of fetishism (and the perversions more generally) to construct the death 
drive that elevates it to the level of “speculative philosophy,” and not the 
disavowal of lack or castration. As Freud himself observes, it is the perversions 
that first “bring to light” the reality of the death drive, making “conspicuous” and 
“tangible” what would otherwise be “silent” and “imperceptible.”35 If we think of 
perversion as a speculative philosophy whose object is the death drive, this 
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clarifies both the contribution it makes to philosophy and the philosophical stakes 
of what seem to be only aberrant or non-normative behaviors. 
In stressing its link with the death drive, the perversions reveal that the 
fantasy of the maternal phallus cannot simply be understood as the child’s 
response to the anatomical makeup of women, and especially to the lack or 
“castration” it is supposed to perceive there. In other words, the reason the 
mother is so important to the perversions (and indeed to the human as such) is 
that the child first encounters the death drive in the mother’s body. It is thus the 
relation of the feminine to the drive that the fetish attempts to stage or formalize, 
and not merely the presence or absence of the expected penis. As Freud himself 
suggests in his account of the “three mothers,” the mother (and more broadly the 
feminine) has always served as a figuration of the drive in its unbounded 
quality.36 In offering the maternal phallus as a figuration of the death drive, 
therefore, the specific contribution of the perversions is to reveal not that woman 
is castrated, but rather that the drive (in the woman) is not castrated.37 That is, 
the woman embodies the excess in drive, and not its lack, finitude, or negation: a 
lack that in man is symbolized by the phallus that inscribes the logic of castration 
in the body as the loss of a part of the living being to the Other of language and 
of culture.  
This is why it is important that the “disavowal of castration” always implies 
at the same time its avowal or recognition. The link between them is the avowal 
of the death drive, whose operation is inseparable from the “castration,” finitude, 
or lack that the pervert seeks to elude or overcome: precisely by declaring his 
fidelity to the drive itself, and not to the signifier that in limiting or erecting a 
barrier against the drive also functions for the neurotic as a defense against the 
real. This further suggests that to perceive the female body in terms of the play of 
presence and absence, lack and supplementation, is to see it not as the pervert 
does, but through the lens of the signifier—and thus in terms of the logic of 
repression that characterizes the neuroses (where repression is always 
repression of the real by the signifier). In contrast, the perverse disavowal of the 
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mother’s castration contests the primacy of the signifier itself, its claim to mediate 
and so debar the plenitude of the real.  
Because the perversions apprehend the maternal phallus at the most 
fundamental level (where the drive itself is at stake, and not “woman”), they are 
also able to render it “cosmic,” to sense the movement of the drive in the 
universe, and not to lodge it at the heart of the family unit as the object of a 
specific complaint or appeal. The corollary is that the maternal phallus cannot 
simply be conflated with the child’s own mother, or for that matter with any 
human female. Sade and Sacher-Masoch both find it “in the real,” where it is 
figured as a prehuman or extrahuman reality: in the form of the “cold steppe,” or 
what Sade calls Nature, our “common mother.”38 Both figures suggest that the 
maternal phallus might best be considered neither as a substitute penis nor as an 
infallible or uncastratable super-penis, but instead as a figuration of the “oneness 
of being,” or as the evocation of a thingliness “outside” of human consciousness 
and its finitude that preexists it or promises to outlast it. As a result, the fantasy of 
the maternal phallus also breaks down in quite surprising ways the distinction 
between the animate and the inanimate, the physical and the human.  
Perverse discourse often represents the death drive not as an object of 
human consciousness, but as something that “predates” the human, that is 
“eternal” or “timeless”: an “animate inanimacy” from which life arises and to which 
it will return, and that life is therefore unable to disturb or limit. It suggests that the 
death drive might best be understood not as something “internal” to us or that we 
“experience” (consciously or unconsciously), but rather as the “great outdoors” 
itself. This possibility is evoked in striking terms by Sade’s “Last Will and 
Testament.” It stipulates that his body be buried in an unmarked grave, whose 
site will then be strewn with acorns to reforest the site of the breach and ensure 
that “the traces of my grave may disappear from the face of the earth.”39 Finitude, 
he suggests, enters the world only with the human, and is solely a matter of 
human consciousness. Once that consciousness is effaced, its negation 
negated, what is left is the fullness of the real in its eternity and timelessness. In 
vanishing from the earth, Sade upholds the completeness of Mother Nature by 
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ceding his place to her. This seems to be what Freud himself suggests when he 
offers the “Nirvana principle” and the “oceanic feeling” as figurations of the death 
drive.40 Both involve the diffusion or absorption of the subject, which gives itself 
over to the drive in such a way as to “become one” with it. 
To stress the psychical function of the “great outdoors” is not to deny that 
there “really is” a world that precedes the human (and life more generally), an 
inanimate world. But as Deleuze shows, this inanimacy is itself strangely animate 
for the pervert, and not merely the physical world of matter. In drawing out this 
specifically perverse insight into the death drive and its functioning, Deleuze’s 
discussion of the “glacial epoch” heralded by Sacher-Masoch allows us to 
appreciate something that might otherwise escape attention in the works of 
Badiou and Meillassoux in particular: the frequency with which they invoke the 
figures of the “stellar,” the “frozen,” and—above all—the “glacial.”41 Meillassoux 
speaks of the glacial as something “ancestral” or pre-human, while for Badiou it 
is something that Lautréamont and Mallarmé propose to “bring forth”—as in his 
evocation of a “glacial anti-humanism” whose advent is made possible by 
mathematics. More than even “cold” (an adjective that really applies only to the 
experience or perspective of an observer—the sensation of cold42—and not to 
inanimate or non-sentient things like landscapes, planets, or stars), “glacial” in 
both cases seems to figure a non-human reality, a world that exists apart from 
our cognition or sensual perception of it. “Glacial” is not a description, that is, but 
a construction. It seems to evoke the slowing down of movement, the becoming-
inanimate of life or the inanimate vitality of non-living things (the movement of the 
tectonic plates, the accretion or erosion of geological formations, or the infinitely 
slow devastation produced by glaciers slicing through land masses). Similarly, 
Deleuze suggests that the “glacial epoch” that masochistic supersensualism 
strives to bring forth is one in which life does not disappear altogether, but is 
“suspended,” removed from its natural temporality, made “eternal” or “timeless.” 
The same could be said of “stellar.” It is surely important for Badiou in 
particular that the star is also a privileged figure of the real for Lacan, as in his 
well-known claim that the real is the “pole star” of human experience inasmuch 
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as it “always returns to the same place.”43 In stressing that the very constancy, 
invariability, and inanimacy of the physical sphere is at the same time a figure of 
repetition, Lacan attempts to capture with the concept of the real a crucial feature 
of Freud’s own theorization of the death drive. In Deleuze’s gloss of the same 
problematic, Freud showed repetition to have two inseparable dimensions. On 
the one hand,  
repetition characterized the binding process inasmuch as it is 
repetition of the very moment of excitation, the moment of the 
emergence of life; repetition is what holds together the instant; it 
constitutes simultaneity. But inseparable from this form of repetition 
we must conceive of another which in its turn repeats what was 
before the instant—before excitation disturbed the indifference of 
the inexcitable and life stirred the inanimate from its sleep. How 
indeed could excitation be bound and thereby discharged except by 
this double action of repetition, which on the one hand binds the 
excitation and on the other tends to eliminate it? Beyond Eros we 
encounter Thanatos; beyond the ground, the abyss of the 
groundless; beyond the repetition that links, the repetition that 
erases and destroys.44 
In repeating the time “before life stirred the inanimate from its sleep,” the 
repetition at stake in the death drive is less a temporal structure than the 
effacement of time, since it reveals the time of the “instant” to be a modality of 
cathexis or binding, the way in which life lays claim to simultaneity or presence.    
Unsurprisingly, Meillassoux does not find Deleuze’s work as helpful for 
understanding the project of speculative realism as I have. Instead, he 
consistently distances himself from Deleuze by accusing the latter of “vitalism.”45 
As I have suggested, however, Deleuze in turn contests and complexifies the 
notion of the “inanimate” or “ancestral” by exposing the vitalist animation of which 
it is capable. As such, his work is not as far removed from Meillassoux’s own 
project as it might at first appear. In both cases we are dealing not with a vitalism 
of life, but with what I propose to call a vital formalism: and thus, as Deleuze 
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himself suggests, a vitalism that might be understood most productively as an 
avatar of the death drive.46 I have argued elsewhere that Badiou’s account of 
“number” should be understood as a formalization of the drive—not in a purely 
symptomatic register, but in a way that really does yield something new and 
enhances our understanding of both.47 This “vital formalism” is more or less 
explicit in Badiou’s work, and is pursued with dedication and rigor. Meillassoux, in 
contrast, is not interested in the drive (or for that matter in any other psychic 
reality) and as a result precludes any consideration of how it might inform the 
“great outdoors” he takes as his object.  
Meillassoux proposes to “call ‘ancestral’ any reality anterior to the 
emergence of the human species—or even anterior to every recognized form of 
life on earth” (10). The choice of “ancestral” to describe a reality prior to the 
emergence of life is quite peculiar, however, since the word implies heredity and 
inheritance (and thus a logic of life). “Ancestral,” the dictionary tells us, is an 
adjective describing what “belongs to or is inherited from ancestors”; alternately, 
it constitutes “the original type, or an earlier type, whence existing forms are 
supposed to have developed.”48 This is even more true of “fossil,” even if 
Meillassoux specifies that he “will call ‘arche-fossil’ or ‘fossil-matter’ not just 
materials indicating the traces of past life, according to the familiar sense of the 
term ‘fossil’, but materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; 
one that is anterior to terrestrial life” (10). Both terms have the effect of animating 
the inanimate sphere, of introducing a certain vitalism into the pre-organic.  
In what sense could a reality anterior to life be conceived as an “ancestor,” 
or as an “original type” from which existing forms would have developed? What 
strikes me in this choice of terms is not merely the animation they attribute to the 
inorganic, but their resonance with the peculiar way in which Freud describes the 
death drive: as a “return” to an inanimate state, which is thereby posited both as 
the origin or prehistory of life and as its regressive destination. He famously 
characterizes the drive as the “expression of the inertia inherent in organic life,” 
“an urge…to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been 
obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces.”49 It follows 
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that the goal of life is not “a state of things which has never yet been attained,” 
but rather an “old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at 
one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous 
paths along which its development leads” (45). These formulations suggest not 
only that the inanimate is “ancestral” in relation to life, but also that the death 
drive expresses the inanimacy that is in life, and that (for the human being, at 
least) even defines life. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
If the fantasy of the phallic mother is not merely the repudiation of an unbearable 
lack or castration that the mother would embody in a particularly stark or 
terrifying way, but instead figures the death drive itself, then this also implies that 
“figure” and “figuration” cease to be solely tropological constructions (predicated 
upon the play of presence and absence, supplementation and lack), and instead 
operate in the manner of plastic supports. This pushes figure and figuration into a 
different sphere, not wholly inscribed within what we generally hold to be the 
founding assumptions of the “linguistic turn.”  
My point in highlighting these “perversions of the linguistic turn” is not 
merely to ironize them, to mark them as impossible or self-defeating, or even to 
attempt (with Derrida and Miller) to reinscribe them within a logic of the signifier. 
It is also to suggest that this turn away from the linguistic turn draws attention to 
a problem that has been there from the very beginnings of rhetoric, that is tied up 
in the genealogy of figura, and that concerns the plastic potential of figure as 
something other than a semiotic signifier.50 This figure, and this “turn away” [per-
versio], are uniquely “perverse”: not in the sense that they would be deviant or 
pathological, incapable of assuming lack or negation, or even primarily 
contestatory or transgressive, but in the sense that they go to the heart of a 
uniquely perverse insight about language in its relation to the real.  
If the fetish is crucial to any consideration of the linguistic turn and its 
stakes, it is because it is defined avant la lettre by the contestation of its core 
premises and offers one of the best examples of its “perversion,” in every sense 
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of the term. This contestation is a disavowal, a fantasy, as even the fetishist 
himself knows. But it also stages or constructs something to which we might not 
otherwise have access: the reality of the psychical object—its very claim to be 
“real,” in Lacan’s idiom—and at the same time the reality of the death drive itself. 
It is crucial to distinguish these two different dimensions of the fetish, which go to 
the heart of the tension within the project of speculative realism. One has to be 
understood as a mere disavowal of mediation, while the other points to its 
beyond, its “outside,” and its possible construction.  
In its special relation to the death drive, the fetish also helps to redefine 
and to recover the stakes of the real. It reminds us that the real is not simply what 
is “excluded,” what “cannot be represented,” and so forth (as the appropriation of 
the concept of the real in the discourses of cultural studies sometimes suggests). 
Instead, the real is located or figured only by means of those objects that 
manage to real-ize, and so force into reality, something that cannot be located 
empirically. Lacan calls it das Ding, the “Thing,” that psychical reality that is 
located “at the center” of the human universe only as excluded. The real 
simultaneously structures reality and unsettles its imaginary coherence, 
producing effects in reality even as it cannot be located there. In this sense its 
operation is akin to that of phenomena like black holes, or what in physics is 
called a “strange attractor”: something we know by its effects, by the way it warps 
space-time, even as it eludes detection or empirical observation. We know it not 
by perceiving it, seeing it, or touching it, that is, but by the way it has warped our 
perceptions, animated the inanimate, and caused reality to come alive or to burst 
into flames: as in Van Gogh’s eerily vitalist landscapes and natures mortes of 
tortured sunflowers, alive with jouissance.51 
Speculative Realism must recognize this fetish, this “thing,” and with it a 
real that is not reducible to a materialism or physicalism. Graham Harman makes 
a similar point in lamenting the tendency of some authors—including Adrian 
Johnston and Meillassoux himself—to conceive the project of speculative realism 
solely in materialist terms, which obliges us “to make a prior decision about what 
the nature of the real must be: physical matter.” In fact, he writes,  
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the real will always retain a certain degree of mystery since by 
definition it is a surplus, something more than any attempt to grasp 
it or relate to it. To put a premature end to this mystery by 
polemically asserting certain features that must belong to the real 
(mass, inertia, extendedness, and so forth) is to replace the real by 
our own model of the real. There is no better name for this strategy 
than idealism, as Bruno Latour has argued effectively enough. We 
can see Meillassoux’s idealism not only in his failed attempt to 
distinguish between absolute idealism and strong correlationism, 
but also in his view that the primary qualities of things are those 
that can be mathematized: as if the things-in-themselves were fully 
translatable into our knowledge of them.52 
Perversion is a speculative realism, and it allows us to construct something that 
these other philosophies avoid only at the expense of drastically limiting and 
reducing the very notion of the thing: the psychic object. Harman and Tristan 
Garcia are exceptions in this regard, rightly affirming that if we really want to 
have an ontology centered on objects, it must extend to all objects: and not 
merely those that could be objects of observation for the empirical sciences or 
whose properties could be mathematized. Garcia in particular includes the 
mental within the project of object-oriented ontology, and thereby shows that the 
promise of this line of work might also be to legitimate and to take seriously the 
“thinghood” or realness of objects previously dismissed as illusory or fictive. In so 
doing, he reminds us that an object-oriented ontology need not be a physicalism. 
Freud famously concludes his 1933 lecture “The Question of a 
Weltanschauung” by declaring that psychoanalysis should by rights belong to the 
Weltanschauung of science, since any science worthy of the name would also 
deal with the mind and the mental. Science has failed to live up to this promise, 
and it is imperative that speculative realism not make the same mistake if it is 
serious about promoting a thought of the real. 
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contingency, its babelian curse, and demonstrates that the privileged number of 
its poetry has no universal status, its alexandrine not always being transposable 
into foreign poems.” The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s 
Coup de dés, 33. Number would accomplish what verse has heretofore failed to 
do, overcoming the contingency of language and managing at last to formalize 
what it is unable to say. 
3 Johnston, “Hume’s Revenge” 112; Graham Harman, “Johnston’s Materialist 
Critique of Meillassoux," 40. 
4 Ray Brassier, “Speculative Realism: Presentation by Ray Brassier”; Adrian 
Johnston, “Hume’s Revenge: À Dieu, Meillassoux?,” 105-6.  
5 This is, of course, arguably the essence of fetishism: at least for some of the 
thinkers who have made use of the concept, including Marx.  
6 Tristan Garcia, Form and Object: A Treatise on Things (Speculative Realism). 
7 “I will call ‘ancestral’ any reality anterior to the emergence of the human 
species—or even anterior to every recognized form of life on earth” (10. 
8 “Empirical science is today capable of producing statements about events 
anterior to the advent of life as well as consciousness. These statements consist 
in the dating of ‘objects’ that are sometimes older than any form of life on earth. 
These dating procedures were called ‘relative’ so long as they pertained to the 
positions of fossils relative to one another (they were arrived at mainly by 
studying the relative depths of the geological strata from which the fossils were 
excavated). Dating became ‘absolute’ with the perfection of techniques (basically 
in the 1930s) that allowed scientists to determine the actual duration of the 
measured objects. These techniques generally rely upon the constant rate of 
disintegration of radioactive nuclei, as well as upon the laws of 
thermoluminescence—the latter permitting the application of dating techniques to 
the light emitted by stars” (9). 
9 “I will call ‘arche-fossil’ or ‘fossil-matter’ not just materials indicating the traces of 
past life, according to the familiar sense of the term ‘fossil’, but materials 
indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; one that is anterior to 
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terrestrial life. An arche-fossil thus designates the material support on the basis 
of which the experiments that yield estimates of ancestral phenomena proceed—
for example, an isotope whose rate of radioactive decay we know, or the 
luminous emission of a star that informs us as to the date of its formation” (10). 
10 Psychopathia Sexualis, 208-209. 
11 Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, in Masochism, 20.  
12 Coldness and Cruelty, 30. Subsequent citations from the same text will be 
given as page numbers in parentheses. 
13 Serge André, L’imposture perverse, 29. 
14 The different stakes of the zero number and of zero-as-lack might be 
understood as enumerating two different approaches to mathematics and 
“integral transmission” in the authors I look at, who alternately appeal to logic and 
mathematics as a means of “monstrating” or formalizing the lack in language or 
as a solution or alternative to it. 
15 Freud, “Medusa’s Head,” Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, 202. 
16 In other words, there is no organic lack in the living body: the mother’s 
“castration” is a psychical reality, accessible only to the human; but at the same 
time, there is no access for the human to the unlacking real of the body. 
17 Jacques Lezra, for example, recently suggested to me an interesting take on 
the relationship between object-oriented ontology and fetishism. The fetishist, he 
claims, has a complicated relation to the individuality of the fetishized object. One 
specific shoe provoked the choice of the fetish. Yet any shoe will produce or 
sustain it, and it can be found everywhere. The fetishist, however, does not see 
the particular. Instead the generic and the individual are sutured by the object, 
such that it is no longer just a shoe, but the shoe as a class. Object-oriented 
ontology is fetishistic, he claims, because it wants that suture for every object. It 
is based on a disavowal of mediation, like all fetishism. If the fetishist wanted to 
address this fetishism, to work on it, he would have to come up against this 
difference. This is why the fetish has to be kept secret. The immediacy is a 
fantasy, and he knows it; but the fetishist wants at all cost not to destroy that 
fantasy. (Lezra made these points in the discussion following a talk he presented 
at Cornell University on November 11, 2014, “Grounds for Materialism,” in 
response to a question I asked about the place of the fetish in his account of 
materialism, which he described as closely bound up with the problem of the 
simulacrum.) As an attempt to suture the generic and the particular, the element 
and the class, fetishism in Lezra’s gloss appears as a kind of category error. By 
extension, the speculative enterprise that shares its fantasy would be less a 
mathematical statement about the real than a logical fallacy. This is why Lezra 
denounces the writers associated with this project as “ontological primitives,” and 
distinguishes their work from what he holds to be the much more interesting 
ontology of Badiou. 
18 La pensée de l’extérieur. Faubion’s edition translates Foucault’s expression 
with “the thought of the outside,” although the genitive could be read either “of” or 
“from”: the second seems to me to better capture the sense of Foucault’s 
argument. 
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19 “The Thought of the Outside,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 149. 
Subsequent citations from the same text will be given as page numbers in 
parentheses. 
20 “When language arrives at its own edge, what it finds is not a positivity that 
contradicts it but the void that will efface it. Into that void it must go, consenting to 
come undone in the rumbling, in the immediate negation of what it says, in a 
silence that is not the intimacy of a secret but a pure outside where words 
endlessly unravel” (152) 
21 “Conversazione con Michel Foucault,” 1967 interview with Paolo Caruso. Cited 
by James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, 154. 
22 See in particular The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, Parts 1, 2, and 3, presented 
by Slavoj Žižek (DVD, directed by Sophie Fiennes) and The Pervert’s Guide to 
Ideology, presented by Slavoj Žižek (DVD 2013, directed by Sophie Fiennes), 
and Mario Perniola, The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic. 
23 Alain Badiou, The Century. 
24 “Mathematics and Philosophy: The Grand Style and the Little Style,” in Alain 
Badiou, Theoretical Writings, 12. 
25 I have written about both pieces in “The New Man’s Fetish,” published in The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy. 
26 Mario Perniola, The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic, 24. 
27 “The Sexual Enlightenment of Children,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Works of Sigmund Freud Volume IX, ed. James Strachey (London:  The Hogarth 
Press, 1955), 134ff. 
28 Deleuze’s reading of Plato’s dialogue The Sophist would be relevant here. In 
his reading of the sophist who challenges Socrates—and through him the 
ontological doctrine of Parmenides—by introducing the problem of the 
simulacrum (that which neither is nor is not) suggests that it is neither of these 
greats who founds philosophy, but the sophist himself (“Plato and the 
Simulacrum,” Logic of Sense, 253-266). Deleuze himself may be the greatest of 
the modern pervert-philosophers, the one who has taken the furthest the 
philosophical program of perversion. 
29 “The function of the masochistic ideal is to ensure the triumph of ice-cold 
sentimentality by dint of coldness. The coldness is used here, as it were, to 
suppress pagan sensuality and keep sadistic sensuality at bay. Sensuality is 
disavowed, and no longer exists in its own right; thus Masoch can announce the 
birth of the new man ‘devoid of sensual love’” (52). 
30 “The scenes in Masoch have of necessity a frozen quality, like statues or 
portraits; they are replicas of works of art, or else they duplicate themselves in 
mirrors (as when Severin catches sight of his own reflection in the mirror”) (69). 
31 Note that suspension, and the suspension of time in particular, plays a crucial 
role in this disavowal. In Deleuze’s words, “The fetishist’s choice of a fetish is 
determined by the last object he saw as a child before becoming aware of the 
missing penis (a shoe, for example, in the case of a glance directed from his feet 
upward). The constant return to this object, this point of departure, enables him 
to validate the existence of the organ that is in dispute. The fetish is therefore not 
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a symbol at all, but as it were a frozen, arrested, two-dimensional image, a 
photograph to which one returns repeatedly to exorcise the dangerous 
consequences of movement, the harmful discoveries that result from exploration; 
it represents the last point at which it is still possible to believe” (31). 
32 In André’s words, “her true identification is with a phallic mother with respect to 
whom all men, beginning with the father, are castrated” (L’imposture perverse 
126); for this fetishist, therefore, castration “is located on the side of man and the 
father, rather than on the side of woman and the mother” (129). 
33 “Theme of the Three Caskets.” 
34 Perniola is also an important case here: fetishism is about being “felt” by an 
object. It therefore attributes a kind of agency or even subjectivity to the thing. 
35 “It was not easy…to demonstrate the activities of this supposed death drive. 
The manifestations of Eros were conspicuous and noisy enough. It might be 
assumed that the death drive operated silently within the organism toward its 
dissolution, but that, of course, was no proof. A more fruitful idea was that a 
portion of the drive is diverted towards the external world and comes to light as a 
drive of aggressiveness and destructiveness. In this way the drive itself could be 
pressed into the service of Eros, in that the organism was destroying some other 
thing, whether animate or inanimate, instead of destroying its own self. At the 
same time one can suspect from this example that the two kinds of instinct 
seldom—perhaps never—appear in isolation from each other, but are alloyed 
with each other in varying and very different proportions and so become 
unrecognizable to our judgment. In sadism, long since known to us as a 
component instinct of sexuality, we should have before us a particularly strong 
alloy of this kind between trends of love and the destructive instinct; while its 
counterpart, masochism, would be a union between destructiveness directed 
inwards and sexuality—a union which makes what is otherwise an imperceptible 
trend into a conspicuous and tangible one.” Civilization and its Discontents, 77-
78; translation modified to put “drive” in the place of “instinct” as a translation for 
the German Trieb.  
36 “The Theme of the Three Caskets.” 
37 The fantasy of the maternal phallus supports the real of the drive and the 
specific modality in which the pervert experiences it, in the unlimited or 
“uncastrated” character of a (maternal) demand that is not mediated or limited by 
the phallic signifier. The fetish could thus be understood as the figuration of the 
potency and excess of the death drive, its urgent and superegoic command. The 
substance of that command is that the subject itself disappear, give itself over 
entirely to the drive, and thereby “complete” the Mother by ceding its place to her. 
38 Marquis de Sade, La philosophie dans le boudoir (Paris: Gallimard Folio, 
1976), 129. These attempts to “positivize” the drive must themselves be regarded 
as particular fantasies, and thus a particular way of denying or refusing castration 
(by associating the drive with an energetic potency or plenitude). Nevertheless, 
they have the effect of “forcing” into consciousness a reality that would otherwise 
be “indiscernible,” as Freud puts it, and therefore at risk of being denied 
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altogether (as the neurotic’s attempt to negate or contain the real by means of 
the signifier would suggest). 
39 Marquis de Sade, “Last Will and Testament,” in Justine, Philosophy in the 
Bedroom, and Other Writings, 157. 
40 Beyond the Pleasure Principle 67. 
41 Interestingly, both Badiou and Meillassoux take this language from Mallarmé, 
whose poetry—and not the science that would allow for the investigation of pre-
human “arche-fossils,” is explicitly identified—by Badiou at least—as the source 
of their investment in the “glacial” or “inhuman.”  
42 Meillassoux makes the same point himself in After Finitude (11-12). 
43 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, 75. 
44 Masochism, 114. 
45 After Finitude, 37. 
46 One of the major contributions of Coldness and Cruelty is its attempt to 
differentiate between sadism and masochism, and the different figurations of the 
drive they offer. If sadism is defined by its investment in the motion, force, and 
destructive “energy” of the drive, an energy that is invariably conceived in 
thermodynamic terms, masochism relies instead upon formality and formalization 
(hence the importance in Sacher-Masoch’s fiction of written contracts, frozen 
statues, paintings and photographs). 
47 “The New Man’s Fetish.” 
48 “Ancestral,” Oxford English Dictionary. 
49 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 43.  
50 This genealogy is brilliantly explored by Erich Auerbach in his seminal essay 
“Figura.” Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach, 65-
113. 
51 This idea of the inanimate “coming to life” as an experience specific to 
perversion is explored in an interesting way by Anne Rice’s Interview with the 
Vampire, where the victim’s exchange of blood with the vampire whose bite 
would otherwise be mortal not only allows him to be “undead,” to become a 
vampire in his turn, but to participate in the specific vitalism of the death drive. In 
the film based on the book this is figured by the new vampire’s sudden 
awareness that the stone statues around him are possessed of agency, or that 
the landscape is writhing with potential energy or oozing blood: a vitalism that 
was imperceptible as long as the vampire was merely alive or human. 
52 “Johnston’s Materialist Critique of Meillassoux,” 40-41. 
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